Henry V was Englands king from the year 1413 up until his death in 1422. Although his reign was not more than a decade, some of his actions marked crucial highlights of English war history, particularly his contribution to the then ongoing Hundred Years War between England and France, which is the main subject that this paper undertakes. Viewed from the light of the writings of three different philosophers, Sun Tzu, St. Thomas of Aquinas, and St. Augustine, this paper analyzes the actions of King Henry V during the battle of Agincourt, which is regarded by historians as Henry Vs greatest war victory during his career. In particular, this paper first gives brief input regarding the origins of the Hundred Years War, and then proceeds to narrate the events that occurred during the said event that concern Henry V and the monarchs crucial actions that influenced the tides of war. Then, this paper analyzes Henry Vs actions in reference to the teachings found in Sun Tzus Art of War, St. Thomas of Aquinas Summa Theologica, and St. Augustines Just War Theory.
The Hundred Years War, like many wars, was primarily a dispute on territory. Back in 1066, the Duke of Normandy captured the English throne during the Battle of Hastings (Curry, 1993). This victory of the Duke posed a major problem in French politics, particularly since the Duke also controlled key territories in France. These problems sparked constant conflicts between the two kingdoms, culminating to a war that officially began when French ships arrived on the English Channel and immediately began taking territories that they claimed were theirs in the first place (Curry, 1993). The war proceeded from king to king, with each king from both sides inheriting the burden of winning the war.
When Henry V came into power in 1413, he immediately took the stand of making reclaiming French occupied territories his main priority (Curry, 1993). Thus after just two years, Henry V sailed for France with a considerable portion of Englands military forces and besieged the fortress of Harfleur, which was captured in less than a months time (Curry, 1993). As further narrated by Curry (1993), rather than concentrating on fortifying Harfleur and using it as a strong foothold on French soil, Henry V opted to use nearly all of his troops to go further into French territory immediately, not heeding the warnings of his war council on the dangers of traveling with limited supplies to enemy grounds. The march lasted for over a month, and the French were already well aware of Henry Vs approaching army. Thus, the French sent its army to intercept Henry V, and having greater knowledge of the terrain, the French army took a key location that would most likely assure them victory. By the time the French intercepted the English, the English army was already exhausted from the March. Henry Vs men were malnourished from the lack of sufficient food and water in their supplies since they left Harfleur, and to make matters worse, the French clearly outnumbered the English. Yet despite these odds, Henry V was able to pull a victory by observing the immediate condition of the battle field. Henry V, or at least his tacticians saw that the terrain had been made muddy by the previous nights rain, and that meeting the French Army head on would result in both armies having to fight on the muddy ground. Given this situation, the English Army placed rows of archers strategically between rows of foot soldiers and then met the French army just as the latter entered the muddy battlefield. Rather than engaging the enemy foot soldiers, the English foot soldiers held their ground and defended the line, while the archers behind them did the work of shooting into enemy lines. The French army was bogged down in the mud that they had difficulty moving up to the Englishs first line of defense, and those who managed to do so were easily cut down by the waiting footmen. Thus, Henry V acquired an easy victory despite having the weaker army. However, shortly after the English conquered the intercepting French forces, Henry V was informed that were was another force gathering to meet him. Fearing that he had already lost the tactical advantage and would now most have a much more difficult time with this new threat, Henry V considered how best to increase his chances of victory and considered having prisoners of war a major liability. War prisoners, those captured after an army had decimated another, were usually allowed to stay alive and used as leverage for demanding ransom. However, Henry V feared that while his army was busy fending off the new French threat, the prisoners would take advantage of the distraction and move against the English army from the rear. Thus, Henry V had all prisoners executed. However, the new French battalion to intercept the English was never formed, which prompted Henry V to cancel the order to execute the prisoners while it was already in progress.
Sun Tzus Art of War has a great deal of focus on the maximization of tactical advantages during battle. Analyzing Henrys actions based on Sun Tzus writings, it can be said that Henry V was able to show during the battle at Harfleur fortress the advantage of having the element of surprise. As Sun Tzu discussed, armies must move speedily and decisively, giving the enemy limited time to predict the armys next course of action thus making them ill prepared for it (Sun Tzu, 1996). Tactically, Henry Vs actions during the succeeding battle with the intercepting French army would also be praised by Sun Tzu. According Sun Tzus writings, considering the terrain and the seasons are critical actions of a military tactician when plotting the best strategy (Sun Tzu, 1996), Sun Tzu (1996) even cites a particular historical example of taking advantage of terrain that is similar to the actions of Henry V. Sun Tzu (1996) would also regard Henry Vs actions of executing prisoners as a means of dealing with a critical weakness. On the other hand, St. Thomas of Aquinas would focus less on military tactics, and more on the justifiability of Henrys actions. In his Summa Theologica on the subject of war, Aquinas (1920) claims that war can only be just when three matters are present, and these are that first the war is waged by the sovereign concerning matters of state, second there should be a just cause, and third for the belligerents of the war to be on the side of good intention. Given these guidelines, it can be said that Henry Vs action of attacking French territory in the name of the Hundred Years War is justified on the first count, since it is a matter of the state that has been ongoing for years. Second, Henry Vs cause is to recover lost territory, which in Aquinas own writings can be considered a way for an erring state to be punished for its previous conquest. However, it is problematic as to whether it is the English or the French who are in the right during this stage of the war. Furthermore to Aquinas writings, Henry Vs actions of using the element of surprise to attack Harfleur, taking advantage of the terrain during the succeeding battle with the French intercepting Army, and killing prisoners of war to prevent them from acting against the English are all justified. This is because for Aquinas, so long as there is no deception through lies, military strategies are justified (Aquinas, 1920). St. Augustine as well would agree that Henry Vs actions during his battles, since St. Augustine likewise believes that so long as the purpose of war is just there is no concern as to the manner through which it is carried out (Aquinas, 1920 Walzer, 1977).
Clearly, Henry Vs actions are seen positively by all three philosophers when considering the contents of their writings. During the Hundred Years War, Henry V was able to display remarkable military tactics while adhering to moral considerations of just wars in both the Augustinian and Thomasian perspectives.
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